



**National
Foreign
Assessment
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Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP79T00912A002700010016-3

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Africa Review

29 September 1978

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RP AR 78-009
29 September 1978

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AFRICA REVIEW

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Namibia: Election Preparations

South Africa's arrangements for conducting a Namibian election in early December conform with some of the points in the Western proposal for settling the question of Namibian independence, although the plan contravenes the basic Western premise of UN participation in all phases of a transitional program. The arrangements, as well as official South African commentary, indicate that Pretoria is aiming to gain enough public sympathy in the West to at least counteract African pressures for UN sanctions unless Pretoria abandons its unilateral program.

On 21 September--the day after Prime Minister Vorster announced that South Africa is proceeding unilaterally to prepare Namibia for independence--the Administrator General for the territory issued detailed regulations that prescribe the procedures for electing members of a constituent assembly. The voting in Namibia will be for parties, not individual candidates. The number of seats in the 50-member constituent assembly that a party may win will be proportional to its share of the votes cast throughout the territory.

The franchise qualifications--announced last June, when the Administrator General initiated a voter registration--are a minimum age of 18, birth in Namibia, or residence in the territory during the past four years. Qualification by only four years of residence enfranchises a large portion of the whites who compose some 12 percent of the total population. Also, eligible voters must be registered on the electoral rolls by 20 October.

The electoral procedures prescribed by the Administrator General conform in theory with the stipulations in the Western settlement proposal that all adult Namibians be eligible to vote and that the election be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity. The Administrator General has announced that he will invite the UN Secretary General and the five Western members of the UN Security Council to send observers "in order to satisfy

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themselves as to the fairness of the process." The South African arrangements, however, do not meet the Western stipulations that a UN task force participate in a seven-month preparatory program to assure that all political prisoners are released, all refugees are allowed to return, all repressive or discriminatory laws are revoked, and that freedom of speech, assembly, movement, and press are guaranteed.

According to the South African information service, over 80 percent of some 400,000 potentially eligible voters had registered by early September. There has been no international monitoring of the voter registration, which was initiated despite objections by the Western advocates of a settlement program under UN auspices.

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Namibian political groups must register by 11 October in order to compete in the election, which is scheduled for 4-8 December. The official explanation is that time must be provided for printing the names of duly registered parties on the ballots. The early deadline could also provide a legal basis for restricting the activities of groups that boycott the election. On the other hand, some 1,100 polling stations will be set up during the five-day polling period to assure that inhabitants in the most remote areas of the territory can conveniently cast their ballots.

On 26 September the Administrator General announced that the voting period had been postponed from late November--the time he announced a week earlier. The foreign-based leaders of the South-West Africa People's Organization have called for an election boycott, primarily because the election is being held without UN participation. The Administrator General apparently hopes that the postponement will mollify rival Namibian groups that have threatened for diverse reasons to join a boycott.

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Nigeria: Main Political Parties Launched

Three main political parties have been formally launched following the removal on 21 September of the 12-year-old ban on politics in preparation for elections early next year. Each group claims to be a national party, but all three are incomplete organizationally and must broaden their limited sectional appeal. It is too early to predict the fate of any one party now on the scene, given the fluid political situation and the quickening pace of maneuvering and coalition-building. Party platforms are focused on domestic issues, and no group has yet addressed foreign policy.

With open politicking in full swing, the government has sternly warned various foreign powers against involvement in Nigerian politics, which could seriously aggravate internal tensions that have built up this year. Despite the potential for political turmoil, the overall mood among civilians is positive.

Nigeria's new constitution for civilian rule has been approved by the ruling military council with relatively few changes. A decree has been promulgated to bring the constitution into effect on 1 October 1979 when civilian government is scheduled to resume.


The Three Main Parties

The United Party of Nigeria is the vehicle of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a veteran politician of the large but politically factionalized Yoruba tribe in southwestern Nigeria. He led a major Yoruba-based party in the early 1960s and has kept its remnants alive throughout the long years of military rule. Now 69 years old and still vigorous, Awolowo will fight hard for the presidency because this could be his last chance due to advancing age. He will be a figure to be reckoned with if only because of his reputation as a shrewd political maneuverer.

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Nigeria: Federal States, Tribal Groups, and Islam



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Awolowo seems to face an uphill fight in building a broad multiethnic coalition necessary to win, though he projects an outward air of confidence. He is seen by his many enemies variously as an archtribalist, a leftist, and a reactionary. Awolowo sharply divides the south, including his own Yoruba tribesmen, among whom he may not command a majority in support of him. He is also widely disliked in the predominantly Muslim north, which particularly resents the increased Yoruba influence in recent years in commerce and the federal civil service. Awolowo may have some limited support in the ethnic minority areas of the south and in the middle belt, an ethnic and religious buffer zone between the Muslim north and the predominantly Christian south.

Awolowo's new party has a clear-cut populist ideology and presumably is aimed at building a national grouping of socialist persuasion among disgruntled farmers, workers, and intellectuals. Its platform calls for free education and health care, integrated rural development, and full employment. At least some leftists of various stripes can be expected to cast their lot with Awolowo.

Spokesmen of the two other emergent parties--which divide the north--seem for now to be concentrating their fire more on each other than against Awolowo. The principal group, the National Party of Nigeria, represents a political marriage of the northern Muslim establishment and the region's younger and more antitraditional elements, who have grudgingly accepted the former's leadership. It is built around remnants of the Hausa-Fulani-led Northern People's Congress party that dominated post-independence electoral politics and is aimed at reestablishing northern control of a future civilian government. The Muslim north has the largest pool of voters, with 38 percent of the electorate. The National Party seems likely to be the northern party with the greatest popular support in the region and to have the best chance of success in the national arena. Structurally, the National Party is based on state branches and has chairmen representing all but one of Nigeria's 19 states.

Despite the diversity of northern elements in the National Party and its apparent inability so far to agree on a presidential candidate, the group seems to be

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gradually overcoming its organizational problems and consolidating its hold in the north. Party spokesmen are vague about its goals, saying only that the group supports national unity and social progress. This suggests that a real platform has yet to be thrashed out.

The National Party's internal problems may be far from over. According to press reports, one contender for the party's presidential nod has bolted and will form a party that will further split the northern vote. He is 58-year-old Aminu Kano, who led a small northern "progressive" party in the early 1960s and who recently played an important role in drafting Nigeria's new constitution. In the past Kano espoused socialist ideals, the interests of downtrodden northern minority tribesmen, and the reform of traditional rule in the north. Kano's current ties, which cut across regional lines, are primarily with progressive-minded academics, students, and intellectuals. If Kano forms his own party, he conceivably could draw away some of the National Party's younger and more radically inclined elements.

The National Party's success on the national scene depends heavily on preventing Islam and the divisive question of religion from becoming a major political issue in the campaign this fall. Such a development would aggravate Nigeria's traditional north-south cleavage and bring to the surface dangerous ethnic and religious antipathies. This would not only inhibit party coalition building, but could jeopardize prospects for a peaceful transition to civilian rule. For now, because the National Party is perceived as a likely winner by many opportunistic Nigerians, it has acquired some support among middle beltters, anti-Awolowo Yorubas, and the large southern Ibo tribe in eastern Nigeria. The injection of Islam in politics could quickly dissipate much of this support.

The third major group to emerge so far, the Nigerian People's Party, is an uncertain amalgam of necessity between a dissident northern Muslim politician who has a national image and various southerners. All of them find Awolowo's group and the National Party unpalatable. The party seems to be based heavily on the so-called "Club of 19," a grouping of young southerners and middle

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belters who were responsible for the defeat in the constituent assembly earlier this year of the controversial northern proposal for a federal Islamic court of appeals. The People's Party also includes a number of old guard anti-Awolowo Yoruba politicians, some older Ibo leaders, and a few former politicians from the eastern minority tribes.

The People's Party platform is moderate in outlook. It has taken a stand as a sort of social democratic party committed to maintaining national unity, keeping Nigeria a secular state, promoting ethnic and economic equality, and working toward full employment and free education.

"Club of 19" supporters, who lack a leader of national stature, seem to provide the People's Party with its main voting strength, organizational talent, and brainpower. The party's most logical presidential candidate is Waziri Ibrahim, a wealthy 52-year-old businessman of the Muslim Kanuri tribe from Borno state. He has joined forces with the "Club of 19" in hopes of keeping alive his sagging presidential prospects. Though Ibrahim is increasingly regarded as an outcast by the northern political establishment, he probably is the only individual in the People's Party who could hope to win any support in the Muslim north. This is necessary for the survival of the party, since both Awolowo's group and the National Party will split the southern vote. The final relationship between the "Club of 19" and Ibrahim remains to be established. The party's presidential candidate will not be announced until after a nominating convention is held.

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Foreign Involvement in Nigerian Politics

Most Nigerian politicians are short of campaign funds, and some apparently have been soliciting help abroad. Head of State General Obasanjo, in announcing the end of the ban on politics, sternly warned outsiders against providing financial and other support to Nigerian politicians. He said that Nigerians suspected of having foreign connections were being closely watched and that individual governments will be held accountable for misdeeds. His injunction was later repeated by Nigerian Foreign Minister Adefope to diplomatic representatives of Libya, USSR, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, UK, and US. Political donations to Nigerian parties by foreign business firms operating in Nigeria apparently are included in Obasanjo's admonition.

Obasanjo's remarks reportedly were aimed primarily at Libya and the USSR. A small minority of younger and more militant members of the National Party are said to be close to Libyan President Qadhafi, and Tripoli reportedly has offered unlimited funds to assure that a Muslim-dominated civilian government comes to power.

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
The Nigerian Government is concerned that the Soviets might use their foothold in neighboring Benin to support Nigeria's small pro-Communist movement if it establishes a party or decides to engage in other political activities. Lagos has been actively exploring with the Beninese Government ways of reducing the Soviet and other Communist country presence there.

Nigerian politicians will be quick to decry real or imaginary foreign connections of opposing political groups--past, present, and future. Their charges, if carried to the extreme, could heighten antiforeign sentiment among less educated Nigerians.

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
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Nigeria: Economic Activity



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Nigeria: Small Return on Oil Wealth*

Despite the marked growth in oil revenues since 1973-74, Lagos is far from establishing a diversified economy before the mid-1980s, when Nigerian oil output is expected to decline. The past four years have seen a major waste of foreign exchange in terms of its contribution to future economic development. Agriculture--the traditional backbone of the Nigerian economy and livelihood of most of the population--has been neglected, and small-scale entrepreneurial skills have not been developed to satisfy a booming local market. At the same time, oil sector performance has been disappointing because of the international economic slump and official pricing policies that have made Nigerian crude among the most expensive in OPEC. Lagos now faces a revenue crunch that sharply limits its ability to channel investment into areas of greatest need.

The Record to Date

The government's 1976-80 development plan aims to expand the manufacturing sector and diversify production. While more than \$30 billion (including \$6 billion in private investment) has been spent, we estimate that less than one-fourth of the plan has been carried out, and many of the projects completed will only marginally help future development. Project delays have been caused by political factors surrounding the overthrow of General Gowon in July 1975, inadequate skilled manpower, and inefficient bureaucracies. The time lost has proven expensive given Nigeria's annual inflation rate of 34 percent in 1975-77 and a 10 percent average annual rise in prices of Western machinery.

The greatest achievements so far have come in development of the public service sector. Port facilities have been expanded, major road networks improved, and domestic

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air service, telecommunications, and electrification are being upgraded. Advancements in essential social services such as education, health care, housing, and public sanitation have been less spectacular. Most notably, a universal primary education scheme--probably the most ambitious single project in the development drive--started on schedule, but quickly bogged down because of shortages of qualified teachers and classroom facilities.

Heavy industrial projects, which were supposed to absorb almost a fifth of planned investment in 1976-80, have encountered cost overruns, difficulty in obtaining raw materials, and bureaucratic bickering. Cement, wood pulp and paper projects, two oil refineries, a liquefied natural gas plant, and an iron and steel complex are behind schedule, some seriously. Two other petroleum refineries, a petrochemical complex, a nitrogenous fertilizer plant, and three direct reduction steel plants have been canceled or postponed indefinitely.

Light industry, financed mostly by private domestic investors or local subsidiaries of multinational corporations, has fared better; production of beer, textiles, canned food, and other light industrial goods rose 15 percent a year in 1976-77.

Reflecting governmental neglect, agriculture has performed poorly as many farmers have left the land in search of higher paying city jobs, and clogged roads have made it difficult to deliver crops to city markets and ports. Nigeria has lost its self-sufficiency in food production, and exports of peanuts, cocoa, palm oil, and rubber have declined. Formerly the world's leading peanut exporter, Nigeria now imports peanut oil.

The Revenue Crunch

The development drive has cut deeply into Nigeria's once healthy foreign exchange reserves, which last month stood at \$1.8 billion, the lowest level in four years. As imports of goods and services have soared, oil revenues have lagged because of stiff competition from North Sea and Alaskan oil as well as rigid government oil pricing policies. The current account balance slipped from a \$5 billion surplus in 1974 to an almost \$1 billion deficit last year. Lagos this year faces a \$3.5 billion to

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\$4 billion deficit. Capital inflows have fallen off in response to government steps to increase Nigerian participation in the economy, forcing Lagos to borrow \$1.75 billion in the Eurodollar market so far this year.

The Obasanjo government has cut oil prices twice this year in an effort to boost sales. While output has improved from a March low of 1.5 million barrels per day (b/d), oil production for the year should average only 1.8 million b/d down from last year's 2.1 million b/d. Oil revenues for 1978 are estimated at \$8.5 billion, a 13 percent drop from last year. Output by 1980 is not expected to be more than 2.3 million to 2.4 million b/d, and crude exports will slip back to the 1976 rate of 2 million b/d as an increasing share of production is diverted to meet the expected 25 percent annual rise in domestic fuel demand. Finally, prospects from maintaining petroleum output throughout the 1980s have been dimmed by the government's failure to offer sufficient investment incentives to the operating companies.

Given these constraints, Lagos will be lucky if it can come up with \$30 billion in total budget revenue over the next two years, which would complete less than half of the investment program. Growing balance-of-payments problems will almost certainly result in further project postponements and/or cancellations. GNP growth probably will not exceed the 6 percent annual average of pre-oil boom years and will be concentrated in services, light industry, and construction. Over the longer haul, the government's ability to cover development costs will depend on trimming nonessential foreign exchange expenditures and stimulating additional foreign investment.

Political Problems Ahead

Preoccupation with the transition to civilian rule scheduled for October 1979 will interfere with Lagos' ability to carry out critical economic policy decisions. Political campaigning could exacerbate Nigeria's regional and ethnic tensions and lead to sporadic civil disorders. Development priorities are likely to be reshuffled by the new government, causing further setbacks to the plan. The new civilian regime is likely to be dominated by northern Hausa-Fulani elements in coalition with eastern Ibos. If so, the new leadership may well decide to boost the share

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
of investment funds going to these regions; most contract awards thus far have been for projects in southern urban areas.

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


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Chad: The First Fruits of National Reconciliation



President Malloum

The protracted struggle between the southern-dominated Chadian Government and the Libyan-backed Muslim rebels from the north passed a milestone late last month when President Malloum announced that an agreement had been reached with one of the rebel groups. Malloum called upon Hissein Habre, leader of one of the smaller rebel factions, to form a new government of "national union" as Prime Minister. In spite of the milestone, however, Chad remains a long way from peace and even further from prosperity.

The accord, in line with Malloum's policy of "national reconciliation," was negotiated over a period of several months following the two sides' agreement in principle at Khartoum last fall. Sudan played the major mediating role in the difficult negotiations, and France maintained pressure on Malloum to reach a settlement with Habre. Malloum, President of Chad's Supreme Military Council and Chief of State since 1975, leads the new government. Habre had fought against the central government for several years. Despite linguistic differences and other problems, the Sudanese believe that both sides should be able to work together.

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Provisions of the New Government



Hissein Habre

The major terms of the agreement call for the dissolution of Malloum's Supreme Military Council and Habre's Northern Armed Forces Command; the integration of Habre's rebel military forces into the national army; the appointment of a chief of state and a Prime Minister; the creation of a 16-member defense and security committee comprised of members from each group; creation of a consultative body--the National Union Council; and elections for a constituent assembly. As a concession to the Muslims, the agreement also mandates that Arabic will join French as a national language. By making concessions to the Muslims and

broadening their participation in the government, the central government hopes to undercut the insurgency continuing in the north.

Although both sides gained posts in the new government, Malloum actually may have strengthened his position. Only the first among equals under the defunct Supreme Military Council, Malloum is now clearly the predominant figure. By enhancing his personal position, retaining the support of his influential moderate backers in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and retaining southern control of the military, Malloum may be better able to allow Habre latitude in seeking to unify the country and resolving other pressing political problems.

For the moment at least, the able and assertive Habre seems to have plunged into the job. The Prime Minister may not be satisfied, however, to remain in a relatively weak position vis-a-vis the President.

Malloum's faction clearly dominates the military. Former Foreign Minister Kamougue, a longtime personal foe

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of Habre whom the new Prime Minister insisted be relegated to a minor ministerial position, retains his influence as commander of the gendarmerie. Although Habre probably recognizes Kamougue's value and importance to the new government, the latter's ambitions could eventually cause problems for the regime. There has been some grumbling among southerners who lost official positions in the government reorganization, but these individuals probably lack the influence to move against the present leaders.

More Rebels--More Negotiations



Toubou Chieftain Goukouni

The major rebel group, led by Toubou Chieftain Goukouni is not a party to the new governmental agreement. Goukouni, whose forces occupy the northern half of Chad and still pose a threat to Ndjamea, is unlikely to agree to participation in a government led by Malloum. Goukouni's Libyan benefactors probably support this position. Malloum's efforts to reach a settlement with Goukouni have foundered despite French pressure on Ndjamea to continue to seek a negotiated solution. In spite of several attempts by Sudan and Niger to mediate the conflict, the most recent round of formal peace talks held in Libya last July bogged down over rebel--

and Libyan--insistence that any agreement contain a specific timetable for the withdrawal of French troops from Chad. This is a subject of primary concern to all sides, and the rebels had originally insisted on the removal of foreign troops as a precondition for negotiations. France's 2,000 soldiers and its detachment of Jaguar aircraft in Chad have been a key factor in preventing the collapse of the government's fragile military and political position.

Until a clash with rebels last week in eastern Chad, the military situation had remained fairly calm since

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
June, when French and Chadian forces defeated a large rebel unit near Ati in the central part of the country. With the exception of minor probes, the rebels have been unwilling to test the Moussoro-Ati-Abeche defense line established by France last spring to protect the more heavily populated southern part of the country. French troops have patrolled as far north as Salal and Arada, where sizable well-armed rebel forces remain, but the French have indicated--to Ndjamena's dismay--that their forces will not take the offensive to recapture territory presently occupied by the insurgents.

The Sudanese apparently intend to continue mediation efforts between the Chadian Government and Goukouni's insurgents. Khartoum, buoyed by its success in reconciling Malloum and Habre, is cautiously optimistic that further success is possible, although they realize the difficulties involved. The Sudanese believe that Libyan President Qadhafi holds the key to peace. Khartoum believes--with considerable justification--that Goukouni is controlled by Tripoli.

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Goukouni's representatives reportedly are in Ndjamena--apparently with Qadhafi's blessing--to continue negotiations with the Chadian Government. Sudan remains seriously concerned over what it perceives as a Soviet-inspired Libyan threat to the region. The Sudanese would like to see Chad remain as a unified, moderate, pro-Western neighbor.

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Although Ndjamenas position has been strengthened and the insurgents' cohesiveness and effectiveness weakened--at least temporarily--the conflict probably will continue without either side making substantial advances. Meanwhile, the US Embassy in Ndjamenas believes the new government charter is too complicated to be implemented effectively. In addition, the carefully balanced structure of the government would be upset if a strong third party such as Goukouni were to seek inclusion. The agreement, however, has several important

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positive aspects. In addition to reconciling at least one group of rebels with the government, it gives the government propaganda to counter charges of tribalism. It also demonstrates Malloum's sincerity in seeking a national reconciliation, increases the strength of the Ndjamea government at a crucial time, and pleases the French.


Although the government reorganization may be the answer to some of Chad's most immediate problems, it will be many months before the new regime will be ready to turn its attention to the country's pressing economic and development problems. The increased Muslim influence and the radical background of Hissein Habre will be offset by Malloum's position and the increased influence of moderate Arab states such as Sudan, and the new Chadian Government probably will remain moderate, pro-Western, and indebted to France.

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China-Tanzania: Still Friends

A visit by Tanzanian Prime Minister Sokoine to Peking on 12 September apparently has smoothed over some rough spots in Sino-Tanzanian relations, although differences in foreign policy emphasis remain. The two allies signed a protocol to their economic and technical cooperation agreement and probably discussed Chinese military aid to the Zimbabwe African National Union.

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Sokoine's visit reportedly was meant to halt the slide in relations with Peking. Judging by the exchange of speeches during his stay, he probably succeeded in reassuring his hosts of Tanzania's determination to resist the growth of inordinate Soviet influence within Tanzania specifically and throughout Africa in general. To Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's warning against Moscow's "pursuit of its ambition of world domination," Sokoine replied that Africa "is not kicking out Western imperialism in order to invite other new masters." Although eager for Soviet military aid, Tanzania remains suspicious of Soviet intentions in Tanzania and southern Africa and keeps the Soviets under close watch.

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Nevertheless, differences in emphasis in the speeches illustrate differing priorities in Chinese and Tanzanian foreign policy. Li emphasized the danger of Soviet ambition; Sokoine emphasized that Tanzania's principal objective is the ouster of white regimes in southern Africa, long a cornerstone of Tanzania's foreign policy.

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Compared to their differences over foreign policy issues, purely bilateral problems between China and Tanzania apparently are minor. Although Peking probably offered no new economic aid, the conclusion of a new protocol suggests that Peking will continue to implement programs under the estimated \$71.8 million left over from earlier credits and grants. The Chinese have also renewed several military aid agreements this year. The Soviets,

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
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who are able to provide more sophisticated hardware than Peking, have long since become Tanzania's principal arms supplier. There will be no large new deliveries of arms. But China will maintain a modest number of military technicians to aid the Tanzanian Air Force and Navy and will continue to provide some weapons, ammunition, and spare parts.



Further evidence of China's desire for continued close relations is the departure for Peking on 20 September of a delegation of the Tanzanian Revolutionary Party led by Minister of Defense Rashidi Kawawa. Peking media emphasis on Kawawa's party responsibilities and his meeting with Chinese officials who conduct liaison with foreign parties suggest that the Chinese have decided to establish party-to-party relations with the Tanzanians. Such a move is in line with Peking's recent decision to institute relations with ruling non-Communist, nationalist parties in the Third World.



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FOR THE RECORD

SIERRA LEONE: President Siaka Stevens is attempting to dilute mounting public unhappiness over the declining economy by encouraging prominent exiles to return and support his new one-party government. His efforts will probably have little success. In recent years, the economy has been seriously hurt by overspending and unrestrained borrowing. The result has been falling reserves and an enormous foreign debt. The average citizen, caught by inflation and declining imports of necessities, such as soap, is beginning to grumble loudly.

This month, Stevens dispatched his two vice presidents abroad--one to the US, the other to the UK--to entice some of the many Sierra Leonean exiles to come home. So far, the emissaries appear to have been met with indifference. A major object of Stevens' attention is Sir Albert Margai, probably Sierra Leone's most prominent exile. Margai is unlikely to respond positively, but another prominent exile, John Karefa-Smart, may be amenable to returning. In the unlikely event Stevens gains considerable exile support, he still will probably avoid tackling the cause of his problems by instituting economic reforms. He has already rejected an IMF proposal--tied to any new loans--for an economic stabilization program. Such a program would cut into Stevens' freedom to subsidize his large security apparatus, which keeps the regime firmly in control, and his spending for pet projects such as facilities for the 1980 summit of the Organization of African Unity which he is scheduled to chair.

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